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Mitigating the Employer’s Exposure to Third
Party Claims of a Hostile Work Environment
John A. Pearce II* and Ilya A. Lipin**
I. INTRODUCTION
Romance in the workplace environment is common and may increase
employers’ exposure to liability. According to a recent survey, fifty-nine
percent of employees admit to participating in a romantic relationship
while at work.1 When asked what type of romance they participated in,
forty-one percent stated that the romance was an ongoing but casual
relationship and thirty-five percent stated that it was a spontaneous office
hook-up.2 Based on their experiences, sixty-four percent stated that they
would participate in the office romance again.3 However, even when the
romantic relationship is consensual, the sexual nature of the office romance
between employees may lead to litigation based on claims of sexual
harassment.4
*John A. Pearce II, Ph.D., is the VSB Endowed Chair in Strategic Management and
Entrepreneurship and Professor of Management, Villanova School of Business, Villanova
University. Professor Pearce received his Ph.D. degree from The Pennsylvania State
University, his M.B.A. degree from the University of Pittsburgh, and his B.B.A. degree
from Ohio University. Dr. Pearce specializes in strategic planning and legal issues in
business. He can be reached at john.pearce@villanova.edu.
**Ilya A. Lipin is an attorney licensed to practice law in Pennsylvania, New Jersey,
and Massachusetts. Mr. Lipin received his LL.M. in Trial Advocacy from Temple
University School of Law, M.B.A. from Villanova School of Business in 2010 where he
was a Graduate Business Fellow, LL.M. in Taxation from Villanova School of Law in 2008,
J.D. from Thomas M. Cooley Law School in 2006, and B.A. from Drew University in 2003.
Mr. Lipin may be reached at ilya.a.lipin@gmail.com.
1. Office Romance Survey 2010, VAULT BLOGS, Feb. 12, 2010, http://blogs.vault.com/
blog/workplace-issues/office-romance-survey-2010/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2015).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See Sexual Harassment Charges EEOC and FEPA Combined: FY 1997–FY 2011,
U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcem
ent/sexualharassment.cfm (stating that in 2010, 11,717 cases alleging sexual harassment and
hostile work environment were filed with the EEOC. The direct monetary benefits paid by
companies to settle sexual harassment and hostile work environment claims through the
EEOC have averaged $48.1 million annually for the past fourteen years). See also Sara
Bliss Kiser, Tyne Coley, Marsha Ford, & Erica Moore, Coffee, Tea, or Me? Romance and
Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 31 S. BUS. REV. 35 (2006) (noting that the largest
monetary payments—which are in addition to these amounts—are determined separately
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“Third-party sexual harassment,” as these claims are called, occurs
when employees are victims of either (1) an unreasonable interference in
their work environment, or (2) an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment.5 In 2014, JPMorgan Chase agreed to pay $1.45
million to settle charges by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission on behalf of a group of sixteen female mortgage bankers.6
The plaintiffs alleged that a “sexually hostile work environment” existed at
the company.7 The sex discrimination lawsuit charged that the women
faced “sexually charged behavior and comments from the supervisory staff
and participating mortgage bankers, which resulted in a sexist and uncivil
atmosphere.”8 The lawsuit also alleged that the female mortgage bankers
who “didn’t embrace and participate in these circumstances became
ostracized and suffered economic consequences by being deprived of
lucrative sales calls, being deprived of training opportunities, and being
denied other benefits of employment.”9 In addition to the cash payments,
the bank agreed to revise its call data retention system record so that future
sales calls can be analyzed to assure that they are more equally distributed
among all mortgage bankers.10
Although the frequency and severity of sexual harassment in the
workplace is widely acknowledged and well documented, the legal
community is only beginning to understand the impacts of workplace
sexual harassment on third parties. One reason for this lack of
understanding is due to the limited amount of cases that have been litigated
in this area.11 A second reason is that a third party case is extremely
through litigation or through arbitration that is commonly advocated by employers to reduce
the corporate costs of litigation and to minimize public disclosures. The U.S. Department of
Labor reports that seventy-one percent of working women cope with some form of sexual
harassment during their careers); Tiffani L. McDonough, Navigating Office Romances and
Avoiding Litigation, 247 (30) THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 5, Feb. 13, 2013; Nolan C. Lickey,
Gregory R. Berry & Karen S. Whelan-Berry, Responding to Workplace Romance: A
Proactive and Pragmatic Approach, 8 J. BUS. INQUIRY, 106 (2009); Maureen S. Binetti,
Romance in the Workplace: When “Love” Becomes Litigation, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 153 (2007).
5. See Grace v. USCAR, 521 F.3d 655 (6th Cir. Mich. 2008). See also Deb Lussier,
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services Inc. and the Future of Title VII Sexual Harassment
Jurisprudence, 39 B.C. L. REV. 937, 941–42 (1998); Jamie C. Chanin, What Is It Good For?
Absolutely Nothing: Eliminating Disparate Treatment of Third Party Sexual Harassment
and All Other Forms of Third Party Harassment, 33 PEPP. L. REV., 385, 401–02 (2006).
6. Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, JPMorgan Chase Will Pay
$1,450,000 to Resolve EEOC Class Sex Discrimination Lawsuit, (Feb. 2, 2013),
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/2-3-14.cfm.
7. Saabira Chaudhuri, J.P. Morgan Agrees to Pay $1.45 Million to Settle SexDiscrimination Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052702304626804579362860949961116.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Courts have found sexual favoritism to constitute a cause of action under Title VII in
the following four cases: Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269 (D.D.C. 1988); Priest v.
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difficult to prove because to prevail, the plaintiff must provide evidence of
sexual harassment in the course of the litigation.12 In the realm of thirdparty sexual harassment claims, plaintiff must prove that sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, or other conduct of sexual nature were so severe
and pervasive that they affected and unreasonably interfered with an
individual’s job performance or created an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment.13
One developing trend in sexual harassment law is that of lawsuits
initiated by third-party co-workers against the employer, based on
consequences of workplace romance. Courts recognize two forms of
sexual harassment: a quid pro quo theory, or a hostile work environment
theory.14 Quid pro quo third-party sexual harassment occurs where
employees who are not personally harassed lose job benefits to other
employees who are direct recipients of such harassment.15 Often referred

Rotary, 634 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Cal. 1986); Toscano v. Nimmo, 570 F. Supp. 1197 (D. Del.
1983); and King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
12. See Cross v. Prairie Meadows Racetrack & Casino, Inc., 615 F.3d 977, 981 (8th Cir.
Iowa 2010) (noting that “[t]he standard for demonstrating a hostile work environment on the
basis of sexual harassment is a demanding one.”). See also U.S. EQUAL EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, POLICY GUIDANCE ON CURRENT ISSUES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT,
EEOC NOTICE N-915-050, Jan. 12, 1990, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/
docs/currentissues.html (hereinafter “EEOC NOTICE N-915-050”) (noting that the EEOC’s
Guidelines define two types of sexual harassment: “quid pro quo” and “hostile
environment” and that “both types of sexual harassment are actionable under section 703 of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), as forms of sex
discrimination.”). See Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. §
1604.11(a) (2004) (noting that EEOC Guidelines state, “[h]arassment on the basis of sex is a
violation of section 703 of title VII. Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment
when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or
condition of an individual’s employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by
an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3)
such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.”). See
also Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64–66 (1986); Harris v. Forklift Sys.,
510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (supporting the same).
13. Prairie Meadows Racetrack & Casino, Inc., 615 F.3d. at 981; EEOC NOTICE N-915050, supra note 12.
14. EEOC NOTICE N-915-050, supra note 12.
15. See Liebovitz v. New York City Transit Auth., 4 F. Supp. 2d. 144, 148 (E.D.N.Y.
1998); Glen Gomes, James M. Owens, & James F. Morgan, The Paramour’s Advantage:
Sexual Favoritism and Permissibly Unfair Discrimination, 18 EMPLOY. RESPONS. RIGHTS J. 73,
77 (2006) (stating that “[i]n contrast to quid pro quo harassment, a hostile or abusive
environment does not require the denial (or threat of denial) of any tangible job benefits;
rather, the severity and pervasiveness of the harassment was viewed as negatively altering the
conditions of employment (and thus was a form of discriminatory behavior.)”); C.M. Hunt, M.
J. Davidson, S. L. Fielden & H. Hoel, Reviewing Sexual Harassment in the Workplace—an
Intervention Model, 39 PERSONNEL REV. 655, 657 (2010) (defining “quid pro quo” as sexual
harassment “where an individual will explicitly or implicitly makes sexual requests and/or
advances as an exchange for some desired result, for example a promotion”).
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to as a “something for something” claim,16 a classic quid pro quo case
involves conditions of employment, where a manager offers an employee
the option of performing a sexual act in order for the employee to achieve
promotion or keep her job. Conversely, the body of hostile work
environment sexual harassment law is broader in nature and “comprises
discriminatory comments, advances, touching, and the like that make the
workplace ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive.’”17 Hostile work environment
jurisprudence permits co-workers who are surrounded by an unwelcomed
sexually charged atmosphere to sue the employer for creating or allowing
an abusive working environment.18
The quid pro quo and hostile work environment theories are not in a
strict dichotomy, and may complement each other. For instance, quid pro
quo harassment can contribute to a hostile work environment.19 In this
situation, the employer will base employment decisions affecting the
employee on the whether the employee will tolerate or reject the
employer’s conduct.20 That is, quid pro quo harassment can exacerbate the
hostile work environment if a supervisor exceeds his authority in a hiring
process by causing someone to tolerate or partake in a sexual act.21
This Article consists of five parts that provide an in-depth overview of
third-party hostile work environment claims and recommend solutions that
employers may utilize to safeguard their employees and decrease risks
associated with costly litigation.
After the introduction in Part I of this article, Part II defines and
describes the origins of hostile work environment claims. Part III presents
specific theories that employees may rely upon to allege third-party hostile
environment claims against their employer. Isolated events may not be
actionable, but under the sexual favoritism theory of hostile work
environment claims, plaintiffs have been successful in proving cases based
upon both systematic and individualized quid pro quo sexual favoritism.
Recovery may be obtained under traditional hostile work environment
theory where the employee, although not subject to direct harassment, must
work in an atmosphere where the harassment is endemic and severe.
Further, under the emerging sex-plus theory, a plaintiff may seek recovery
where gender discrimination occurs in combination with discrimination
against an additional characteristic, such as personal relationship status,
marital status, pregnancy or fertility, or familial status.

16. Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 532 (7th Cir. Ill. 1997) (“The term
quid pro quo literally means ‘something for something.’”).
17. Eugene Scalia, The Strange Career of Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, 21 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 307, 308 (1998).
18. See Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67.
19. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2004).
20. Id.
21. See EEOC NOTICE N-915-050, supra note 12.

Summer 2015] MITIGATING THE EMPLOYER’S EXPOSURE

323

Part IV recommends solutions that employers can implement in order
to prevent hostile work environments from arising at their company. Part
V concludes this article and makes predictions on the future of the thirdparty hostile environment claims moving forward.

II. HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT LAW
Hostile work environment law has been evolving and growing for
nearly fifty years, based upon a complex combination of statutory law,
regulations, and case law. A party prosecuting or defending against a thirdparty hostile work environment claim will benefit from understanding the
law’s development and the current legal requirements.
A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT LAW

The origin of hostile work environment law is found in Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which makes it “an unlawful employment
practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex.”22 Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) regulations provide additional
guidance and interpreted Title VII to protect against unwelcome sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct
of a sexual nature when “such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating
an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.”23 Further,
EEOC regulations provided that “where employment opportunities or
benefits are granted because of an individual’s submission to the
employer’s sexual advances or requests for sexual favors, the employer
may be held liable for unlawful sex discrimination against other persons
who were qualified for but denied that employment opportunity. . . .”24
State laws, such as California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act
(“FEHA”) and Washington’s Law against Discrimination (“WLAD”),
afford additional protection for employees against hostile work
environments.25

22. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2010).
23. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (2004).
24. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(g) (2004).
25. Under FEHA, an employee may establish an actionable claim of sexual harassment
by demonstrating that widespread sexual favoritism was severe or pervasive enough to alter
his or her working conditions and create a hostile working environment. See California Fair
Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Gov’t Code § 12900, et seq. (West 2015) (noting that
California law recognizes that sexual harassment occurs when a sexual relationship between
a supervisor and a subordinate is based upon quid pro quo; the law protects employees
against an employer’s retaliation in the event that the employee files a complaint or protests
conduct prohibited by FEHA).
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On a case-by-case basis, courts have clarified the definition of hostile
work environment and the doctrine’s applicability to employer-employee
relationships. In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, the Supreme Court
for the first time expressly recognized that Title VII prohibits sexual
harassment that creates a hostile work environment.26 In Meritor, a female
bank employee brought a claim against her supervisor and employer
alleging that she was sexually harassed during her four-year period by her
supervisor, which created an unwelcomed offensive and hostile work
environment in violation of Title VII.27 At the district court level, the
plaintiff provided testimony that her supervisor invited her out to dinner
and suggested to have sexual relations with him at the hotel.28 Although
she has initially refused, the plaintiff has ascended to the advances because
she was afraid to lose her job. The plaintiff testified that she had
intercourse with her supervisor “some 40 to 50 times,” was fondled in front
of her co-workers, was raped in the bathroom, and that her supervisor
would expose himself in front of her.29 The plaintiff also alleged that the
supervisor fondled other female bank employees.30 Since the plaintiff was
afraid of the consequences of filing a complaint and her supervisor, she has
never reported this harassment or followed employer’s complaint
procedures. Conversely, the supervisor denied these allegations and
contended that the allegations were made because of a business-related
dispute.31
The Supreme Court analyzed the Title VII and EEOC regulations
pertaining to sexual harassment and hostile environment. The Court
concluded based on evidence presented that the plaintiff’s claim of hostile
work environment was actionable under Title VII.32 The Court stated that
Title VII “is not limited to ‘economic’ or ‘tangible’ discrimination.”33 The
phrase “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” contained in Title
VII evidences Congress’s intent to “strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women in the employment,” which includes
requiring employees to work in hostile and abusive environments.34 Thus,
the Supreme Court held that “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with
26. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 66.
27. Id. at 60.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 60–61.
31. Id. at 61.
32. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 66, 73. (The Supreme Court noted that the EEOC
Guidelines state that Title VII is meant to be interpreted to afford “employees the right to work
in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.” Further, the
Supreme Courted noted that “[n]othing in Title VII suggests that a hostile environment based
on discriminatory sexual harassment should not be likewise prohibited. The Guidelines thus
appropriately drew from, and were fully consistent with, the existing case law.”).
33. Id. at 64.
34. Id. at 65.
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‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,’ that is ‘sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and
create an abusive working environment,’ Title VII is violated.”35
In a subsequent case, Harris v. Forklift Systems, the Supreme Court
further defined and established standards to for evaluating the scope of
hostile work environment.36 In Harris, a female manager filed a suit
against her employer, an equipment rental company, claiming that behavior
of her male supervisor who was the company’s president created “an
abusive work environment for her because of her gender.”37 Specifically,
the plaintiff alleged that her supervisor made her “the target of unwanted
sexual innuendos” in the presence of her co-workers, suggested a trip to
Holiday Inn to negotiate her raise, asked to get coins out of his pockets,
threw objects on the ground and asked the plaintiff to pick them up, and
made sexual comments about the plaintiff’s clothing.38 The District and the
Appeals courts held that the supervisor’s behavior did not reach a level of
severity that would affect plaintiff psychologically.39 This behavior did
not create a hostile work environment for the plaintiff, even though the
supervisor’s comments would offend a reasonable woman.40
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, stating that to determine
whether harassment in the workplace results in a hostile work environment
one should look at the totality of circumstances and consider the frequency
and severity of the conduct, whether the conduct is physical, threatening,
humiliating, or merely offensive, and whether the conduct “unreasonably
interferes with employee’s work performance.”41 The Supreme Court
noted there is no clear boundary when harassment creates a hostile work
environment and becomes actionable. Title VII applies when such
behavior may affect employee’s job performance, discourage remaining at
the job, or keep from advancing in the career.42 In this case, it was
sufficiently hostile that the employee had a nervous breakdown as a result
of the harassment at work.
Although not anticipated at the time, both Meritor and Harris provide
guidance for the hostile work environment law’s recent expansion to third35. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67).
36. Id. at 20 (stating that the Supreme Court granted certiorari “to resolve a conflict
among the Circuits on whether conduct, to be actionable as ‘abusive work environment’
harassment . . . must ‘seriously affect [an employee’s] psychological well-being’ or lead the
plaintiff to ‘suffer injury.’”).
37. Id. at 19.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 19–20.
40. Id.
41. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23 (“The effect on the employee’s psychological well-being is, of
course, relevant to determining whether the plaintiff actually found the environment
abusive. But while psychological harm, like any other relevant factor, may be taken into
account, no single factor is required.”).
42. Id. at 22.
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party claims. Both decisions remain relevant in showing that Title VII
intended to protect against hostile work environment claims, including
those currently brought by third-party litigants. Last, the holdings and the
underlying analysis in Meritor and Harris provides for the roadmap the
courts should use today in evaluating hostile work environment claims
brought by a third party.43
B. HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT LAW TODAY

The term “hostile work environment” has evolved to describe a
workplace atmosphere in which offensive, hostile, abusive conduct is
common,44 or in which management or coworkers exhibit favoritism towards
certain employees at the expense of others45 caused by management46 or
coworkers.47 In general, to prove a third-party hostile work environment
harassment claim, an employee must prove all of five elements: (1) that he or
she meets a definition of an “employee” as defined by Title VII; (2) that the
employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment, such as sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other conduct of a sexual nature;
(3) that the harassment was based on the sex of the employee;48 (4) that the
harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and
conditions of employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working
environment; and (5) that the harassment is imputable to the employer.49
Courts have provided additional guidance for these five elements.
43. See discussion infra Part III (discussing hostile work environment law as it pertains to
third-party claimants).
44. See Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67.
45. See Proksel v. Gattis, 41 Cal. App. 4th 1626 (1996). See Miller v. Dept. of
Corrections, 36 Cal. 4th 446 (Cal. 2005) (discussing favoritism).
46. See Miller, 36 Cal. 4th at 451.
47. See Huston v. Procter & Gamble Paper Products Corp., 568 F.3d 100 (3d Cir. 2009).
See also C.M. Hunt, et al., supra note 15, at 657 (defining hostile work environment as
“sex-related behaviours which make the victim feel uncomfortable . . . thus producing a
hostile work environment.”). See also Brady Coleman, Introduction to the Symposium on
Workplace Bullying: Pragmatism’s Insult: The Growing Interdisciplinary Challenge to
American Harassment Jurisprudence, 8 EMP. RTS. & POL’Y J. 239, 248 (2004) (defining
hostile work environment as “conduct of a sexual nature [that] creates an intimidating or
abusive work environment”); Alana C. Brown, Ninth Annual Review of Gender and
Sexuality Law: Education Law Chapter: Sexual Harassment in Education, 9 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 813, 832 n. 25 (“A hostile work environment, in sexual harassment law, is a
workplace where an employee, although not denied promotions or other privileges, is
treated badly based on a trait protected by Title VII, such as race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.”).
48. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2004) (stating that “[h]arassment on the basis of sex is a
violation of section 703 of title VII.”). See also EEOC NOTICE N-915-050, supra note 12
(supporting the same). See also Michael J. Phillips, The Dubious Title VII Cause of Action
For Sexual Favoritism, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 547, 591 (1994) (noting that to have a
viable Title VII claim “it still is necessary for the plaintiff to have been disadvantaged
because of his or her own gender”).
49. See Kalich v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 679 F.3d 464, 470 (6th Cir. 2012).
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1. Element One: “Employee” Defined
The first element requires the plaintiff to be an employee as defined by
Title VII. The term “employee” is defined as “an individual employed by an
employer.”50 The definition specifically excludes any individuals elected to
public office and its appointees, but not employees subject to civil service
laws of state government agency, or political subdivisions.51 Thus, if the
plaintiff is not an employee as defined by the statute, he or she will not be
protected under this law.52 The law applies to all employees and does not
distinguish between managers and other subordinate employees.53
2. Element Two: Unwelcome
The second element requires the plaintiff to have been subjected to
some form of sexual harassment. This harassment has to be unwelcomed.54
The court has defined the term “unwelcomed sexual harassment” as
“sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature that is unwelcome in the sense that it is
unsolicited or unincited and is undesirable or offensive to the employee.”55
3. Element Three: Gender-Based
The third element requires that the sexual harassment be based on the
sex of the employee. Here, the plaintiff must show that but for the
employee’s gender, he or she would not have been sexually harassed,56 or
stated differently, that the “harassment was gender-based.”57 To prove this
element, the plaintiff should present evidence that “members of one sex are
exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which
members of the other sex are not exposed.”58 If plaintiff fails to present
evidence of “some gender-based animus,” the claim may be denied even if
the comments made toward the aggrieved party were sexual in nature.59

50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2010).
51. Id.
52. Id. See also Haynie v. State, 664 N.W.2d 129, 133 (Mich. 2003) (noting that if the
plaintiff is an employee, he or she meets the requirement imposed by the first element).
53. See Galdamez v. Potter, 415 F.3d 1015, 1022 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting the equal
application of the law to all employees).
54. Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding
that sexual harassment has to be unwelcomed to be actionable).
55. Frensley v. N. Miss. Med. Ctr., Inc., 440 F.App’x 383, 386 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing
Marquez v. Voicestream Wireless Corp., 115 F.App’x 699, 701 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). See also Bruno v. Monroe County, 383 F.App’x 845, 847 (11th
Cir. 2010) (noting that unwanted sexual conduct includes “sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, and other conduct of a sexual nature.”).
56. Hoyle v. Freightliner, LLC, 650 F.3d 321, 331 (4th Cir. 2011).
57. Kalich, 679 F.3d at 470.
58. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (internal quotations
omitted).
59. Kalich, 679 F.3d at 473.
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Claims may be brought in cases of same-sex harassment, i.e.,
harassment between individuals of the same gender.60 In same-sex cases,
the plaintiff may establish the third element by: “(1) showing that the
harasser making sexual advances acted out of a sexual desire; (2) showing
that the harasser was motivated by general hostility to the presence of men
[or women] in the workplace; or (3) offering direct comparative evidence
about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixedsex workplace.”61 In the same-sex harassment claim, sexual orientation of
the parties is irrelevant.62 Thus, a same-sex harassment claim may exist in
circumstances with the heterosexual or homosexual parties.
4. Element Four: Severe or Pervasive
The fourth element requires that behaviors creating a hostile work
environment be sufficiently severe or pervasive to interfere unreasonably
with an employee’s job performance.63 Courts have developed a test that
includes two components, both of which the plaintiff must satisfy to
prevail.64
a.

Subjective Component

Under the first, subjective component, the employee must show that
sexual harassment was severe enough to change the conditions of
employment, i.e., to create a hostile working environment.65 To reach a
sufficient level of severity, the employer’s conduct must be continuous and
may not be isolated or trivial,66 but sexual advances by the employer on the
60. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79–80 (noting that “Title VII prohibits ‘discrimination. . .
because of . . . sex’ in the ‘terms’ or ‘conditions’ of employment. Our holding that this
includes sexual harassment must extend to sexual harassment of any kind that meets the
statutory requirements.”).
61. Kalich, 679 F.3d at 471 (citing Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 765 (6th
Cir. 2006)) (internal citations omitted).
62. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 75 (holding that Title VII applies to sexual discrimination
consisting of harassment between members of the same gender). See also Melnychenko v.
84 Lumber Co., 424 Mass. 285 (1997) (discussing same-sex harassment claims); Smith v.
Brimfield Precision, Inc., 1995 Mass. Comm. Discrim. LEXIS 7 (1995) (discussing same).
63. See Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67. See also Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 638 (U.S. 2007) (stating that a hostile work environment claim
“comprises a succession of harassing acts, each of which ‘may not be actionable on its own’
. . . [and] ‘cannot be said to occur on any particular day.’ In other words, the actionable
wrong is the environment, not the individual acts that, taken together, create the
environment.”) (citations omitted).
64. Smith v. Naples Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 433 F.App’x. 797, 799 (11th Cir. 2011).
65. Id. at 799.
66. Proksel v. Gattis, 41 Cal. App. 4th 1626, 1631 (1996) (citing Fisher v. San Pedro
Peninsula Hosp., 214 Cal. App. 3d 590, 610 (1989)). See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N POLICY STATEMENT NO. 915-048 (Jan. 12, 1990), available at http://www.eeoc.
gov/policy/docs/sexualfavor.html (stating that “[a]n isolated instance of favoritism toward a
‘paramour’ (or a spouse, or a friend) may be unfair, but it does not discriminate against
women or men in violation of Title VII, since both are disadvantaged for reasons other than
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plaintiff are not required.67 As part of the claim, plaintiffs are not required
to prove any physical manifestations of the harm.68
Whether the sexual harassment was severe enough to change the
conditions of employment is a question of fact and is determined on a caseby-case basis.69 For example, in Blakey v. Continental Airlines, a female
pilot successfully sued an employer airline for creating a hostile work
environment after pornographic pictures of her were posted in the cockpits
of the aircraft, coworkers and managers made obscene and harassing
comments about her, and the employer failed to take appropriate actions to
remedy the situation.70 The airline filed for summary judgment on the
hostile work environment claim, but the court denied the motion. They
found that a dispute of fact existed, and the airline had a duty to act to
prevent harassment of its employees.71
There are, however, multiple cases where the courts have held that
inappropriate conduct did not rise to the level of severity to create a hostile
work environment. For instance, in Webb-Edwards v. Orange County
Sheriff’s Office, the court held that a supervisor’s comments about the
plaintiff’s body shape and her attractive appearance, and his request that
she wear tighter clothing, did not constitute a hostile work environment.72
Similarly, in another case, Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., the court held
that no hostile work environment claim existed where the manager called
his subordinate a “pretty girl,” commented that “there’s always a pretty girl
giving me something to sign off on,” made “a grunting sound” at the
plaintiff who wearing a leather skirt, commented on “how hot” the
subordinate was, and stated that “all pretty girls should run around naked”
in the office.73
b. Objective Component
Under the second, objective component, the hostility of the working
environment is evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances from
the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position.74 This
their genders.”). See also Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780, 784 (E.D. Wis.
1984) (noting that Title VII does not serve “as a vehicle for vindicating the petty slights
suffered by the hypertensive”).
67. See Mogilefsky v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. App. 4th 1409, 1414 (1993).
68. See Smith v. Fairview Ridges Hosp., 625 F.3d 1076, 1089 (8th Cir. 2010) (Bye, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the physical manifestation requirement of the fourth element).
69. See Sharon D. Nelson & John W. Simek, Mitigating Legal Risks Using Social Media,
INFO. MGMT. J., Sep./Oct. 2011, at HT 10 (discussing factual and legal interpretation
dispute); Harris, 510 U.S. at 17, 21–23 (noting factual determination); Pucino v. Verizon
Commc’ns., Inc., 618 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2010) (reversing summary judgment motion and
allowing hostile work environment claim to proceed).
70. Blakey v. Continental Airlines, 992 F. Supp. 731, 733 (D.N.J. 1998).
71. Id. at 739.
72. Webb-Edwards v. Orange County Sheriff’s Office, 525 F.3d 1013, 1027 (11th Cir. 2008).
73. Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995).
74. Harris, 510 U.S. at 17.
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view may be based on the plaintiff’s gender, i.e., would a reasonable
person of the same gender in the plaintiff’s circumstances find the sexual
harassment to be abusive or hostile enough to create a hostile work
environment.75 This reasonableness standard considers the defendant’s
behavior from the plaintiff’s perspective.76
The courts may rely on the following list of factors in determining if
the objective component is met:77
(1) The frequency and the severity of the conduct;
(2) “Whether the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating,
or a mere offensive utterance;
(3) “Whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with the
employee’s job performance;”78
(4) “The effect on the employee’s psychological well-being;”79
(5) Social context, the surrounding circumstances, relationships,
and the worker’s expectations;80
(6) “The general work atmosphere, involving employees other than
the plaintiff;”81
(7) “Whether the alleged harasser was a co-worker or a supervisor;
(8) “Whether . . . others joined in perpetrating the harassment; and
(9) “Whether the harassment was directed at more than one
individual.”82
In applying these tests, the courts have reached several determinations
regarding conduct that is not sufficiently severed. For example, by itself, a
co-worker’s romantic involvement with a supervisor does not create a
hostile work environment.83 For another, sexual flirtation or innuendo, or
vulgar language that is trivial or merely annoying, does not establish a
hostile work environment.84 However, unequal treatment of employees,
combined with sexually explicit behaviors by the employer, may be

75. See Alvarado v. Fed. Express Corp., 384 F.App’x. 585, 588 (9th Cir. 2010).
76. See EEOC NOTICE N-915-050, supra note 12.
77. See Reeves v. DSI Sec. Servs., Inc., 395 F.App’x. 544, 546 (11th Cir. 2010).
78. Harris, 510 U.S. at 17. See Reeves, 395 F.App’x. at 546 (discussing factors needed
to show that sexual harassment was objectively severe).
79. Harris, 510 U.S. at 17.
80. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 72 (1998) (discussing the totality of circumstances).
81. See Fisher, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 610.
82. EEOC NOTICE N-915-050, supra note 12.
83. See Candelore v. Clark County Sanitation Dist., 975 F.2d 588, 590 (9th Cir. 1992).
84. See EEOC NOTICE N-915-050, supra note 12. See also Suarez v. Pueblo Int’l, Inc.,
229 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. P.R. 2000) (“The workplace is not a cocoon, and those who labor
in it are expected to have reasonably thick skins—thick enough, at least, to survive the
ordinary slings and arrows that workers routinely encounter in a hard, cold world.”).
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actionable.85 Manifestations of an alleged affair between the employer and
employee, such as sexual horseplay in the office to an egregious and/or
frequent degree, or preferential treatment of the co-worker that prevents a
co-worker/plaintiff from being evaluated on grounds other than his or her
sexuality, help to establish a work situation that may be actionable.86
5. Element Five: Employer Liability
Finally, the fifth element requires the plaintiff employee to prove a
basis for employer liability.87 The third-party plaintiff must provide
evidence that the employer “knew or should have known” that the
harassment occurred, but “failed to take prompt and effective remedial
action.”88 One of the means to show employer’s knowledge is for
employee to provide proof that notice was given to the employer regarding
the behavior that is believed to have created a hostile work environment.89
There are circumstances where the plaintiff does not have a reasonable
avenue to complain and provide notice to an employer. For instance, such
circumstances may exist where an employer does not provide a reasonable
avenue of complaint or employee was afraid to give such notice due to
possibility of retaliation or harm. Thus, employer may still have exposure
to legal liability if it had knowledge or could have known through an
exercise of reasonable care about the harassment but failed to take
appropriate remedial action.90 To show knowledge under this alternative
standard, the plaintiff must show that “(1) someone had actual or
constructive knowledge of the harassment, (2) the knowledge of this
individual can be imputed to the employer, and (3) the employer’s
response, in light of that knowledge, was unreasonable.”91
To establish that the employer has failed to act, the employee must
provide evidence that he or she took advantage of corrective opportunities
85. Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1269.
86. Keenan v. Allan, 889 F. Supp. 1320, 1374–75 (E.D. Wash. 1995).
87. See Smith v. Naples Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 433 Fed. App’x. 797, 801 (11th Cir. 2011).
Some cases use this analysis as a sixth element, having separated the severe or pervasive,
and subjectively and objectively unreasonable tests into two elements, but the language is
very similar and the tests are generally used interchangeably by courts. See, e.g., PérezCordero v. Wal-Mart P.R., Inc., 656 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2011) (identifying and analyzing
six elements, including (4) severe or pervasive; (5) objectively and subjectively
unreasonable; and (6) employer liability).
88. Smith v. Hy-Vee, Inc, 622 F.3d 904, 907 (8th Cir. 2010). See also Blackmon v. WalMart Stores East, L.P., 358 F.App’x. 101, 103 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing and quoting Miller v.
Kenworth of Dothan Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1278 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that “when the
perpetrator of the harassment is merely a co-employee of the victim, the employer is liable
only ‘if it knew or should have known of the harassing conduct but failed to take prompt
remedial action.’”).
89. See Duch v. Jakubek, 588 F.3d 757, 762 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussing that the employee
should provide notice about questionable behavior that is believed to have created a hostile
work environment).
90. Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 154 (2d Cir. 2000).
91. Duch, 588 F.3d at 763.
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provided by the employer, such as timely providing notice to the proper
authorities within the company and acting as prescribed by the employee
handbook.92 The employee has a duty to take reasonable action to avoid
harm, and thus mitigate damages.93 To avoid liability, the employer’s
response to the employee’s notice regarding sexual harassment must not be
indifferent or “indicate an attitude of permissiveness that amounts to
discrimination.”94

III. THIRD-PARTY HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT CLAIMS
AGAINST THE EMPLOYER
Within the framework of a hostile work environment, a third party,
commonly a co-worker of the employee romantically involved with or
harassed by a supervisor, may sue the employer. The third party may
litigate such a claim under either the favoritism95 or third-party sexual
harassment theories.96
A. FAVORITISM
Favoritism takes three forms: (1) isolated instances toward an
employee paramour, (2) favoritism based on coerced sexual conduct, and
(3) widespread favoritism.97 The first two forms, isolated instances of
favoritism or favoritism based on coerced sexual conduct toward a
paramour, are unlikely to provide recovery for a third-party plaintiff. Only
sexual harassment that is based on widespread favoritism is recognized by
the EEOC Policy Guidance,98 which is often followed by state and federal
courts in deciding whether a hostile work environment exists.99
Accordingly, this Article will show that widespread favoritism can be a
basis by which third-party plaintiffs may successfully pursue litigation.
An employer’s sexual favoritism or preferential treatment may create a
hostile work environment when conducted in an indiscreet manner, causing
92. May v. FedEx Freight East, Inc., 374 F.App’x. 510, 512 (5th Cir. 2010) (describing
evidence employee should provide to prove employer’s failure to act after the notice was given).
93. See Agusty-Reyes v. Dep’t of Educ., 601 F.3d 45, 53 (1st Cir. 2010) (noting that employee
must reasonably try to avoid harm and an employee’s failure to do so constitutes an affirmative
defense for the employer).
94. See West v. Tyson Foods, 374 F.App’x 624, 632 (6th Cir. 2010) (“When an employer
implements a remedy, it can be liable for sex discrimination in violation of Title VII only if
that remedy exhibits such indifference as to indicate an attitude of permissiveness that
amounts to discrimination.”).
95. See Miller, 36 Cal. 4th at 451.
96. See Liebovitz, 4 F. Supp. 2d. at 144.
97. See EEOC NOTICE N-915-050, supra note 12.
98. Id. (citing Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1278) (noting that the EEOC denies that third
party claims are actionable in cases of isolated sexual harassment).
99. See Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 63 (referencing EEOC definitions and guidelines).
See also Proksel, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1626; Miller, 36 Cal. 4th at 446; Broderick, 685 F.
Supp. at 1269 (supporting the same proposition).

Summer 2015] MITIGATING THE EMPLOYER’S EXPOSURE

333

plaintiffs to believe that favorable treatment may be obtained from the
employer in exchange for a romantic or sexual relationship,100 Co-workers
of an employee engaged in a relationship with a superior may perceive that
the person in power favors that employee, and thus raise allegations of the
existence of the hostile work environment.101 Under third-party sexual
harassment doctrine, this favoritism occurs when a supervisor in such a
relationship awards benefits to the employee with whom he or she is
having a personal relationship, thereby denying the benefits to similarly
qualified third-party employees.102 For the claim to succeed, the employee
must be qualified for the job.103 Consistently, EEOC regulations define
favoritism as a situation “where employment opportunities or benefits are
granted because of an individual’s submission to the employer’s sexual
advances or requests for sexual favors . . . .”104 Additionally according to
the regulations, an employer may be liable for unlawful sex discrimination
against other persons who were qualified for but denied that employment
opportunity or benefit.105
1. Isolated Instances of Favoritism toward a Paramour
The first category of favoritism involves isolated instances of
favoritism toward a paramour.106 According to the EEOC, an isolated
instance of preferential treatment based on consensual romantic
relationships does not violate Title VII.107 Thus, for example, a female
100. Miller, 36 Cal. at 451, 465 (citing Proksel, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1629–30) (The court in
dictum suggested that “sexual favoritism by a manager may be actionable when it leads
employees to believe that ‘they [can] obtain favorable treatment from [the manager] if they
became romantically involved with him’. . . the affair is conducted in a manner ‘so
indiscreet as to create a hostile work environment,’ or the manager has engaged in ‘other
pervasive conduct . . . which created a hostile work environment.’”).
101. See Miller, 36 Cal. 4th at 468; 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(g) (2004).
102. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N NOTICE NO. N-915.048, POLICY GUIDANCE ON
EMPLOYER LIABILITY UNDER TITLE VII FOR SEXUAL FAVORITISM (1990), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docsfsexualfavor.html (hereinafter “EEOC NOTICE N-915.048”)
(noting that the EEOC Policy Guidance defines sexual favoritism as discrimination “against
individuals who are qualified for but are denied an employment opportunity or benefit, where
the individual who is granted the opportunity or benefit received it because that person
submitted to sexual advances or requests.”); see Phillips, supra note 48, at 549, (stating that
“[i]n the typical sexual favoritism (or ‘paramour’) claim, the plaintiff alleges that her employer
has violated Title VII by favoring another employee (the paramour) due to a sexual or
romantic relationship between a supervisor and the paramour.”).
103. Phillips, supra note 48, at 556 (noting that in example, EEOC has stated that the
charging party, plaintiff, must be qualified for a job from which he or she was denied due to
the widespread favoritism).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See EEOC NOTICE N-915-050, supra note 12.
107. EEOC NOTICE N-915-050, supra note 12.
It is the Commission’s position that Title VII does not prohibit instances of
preferential treatment based upon consensual romantic relationships. An
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plaintiff who is denied an employment benefit because her supervisor
awards it to his paramour would not have a viable Title VII claim based on
this single, isolated instance of sexual favoritism.108
Courts tend to agree with the EEOC’s assessment of single instances.
At least one case suggests that a plaintiff’s allegation of the existence of a
hostile work environment must be substantiated by a pattern of repeated,
routine, or generalized level of harassing behavior by the defendant.109
Because of the difficulties inherent in providing these types of evidence,
plaintiffs usually fail to prove the existence of a hostile work environment.
For instance, in Proksel v. Gattis, a female plaintiff worked as a
personal secretary and office manager for a male defendant attorney.110
During the time of plaintiff’s employment, the defendant hired another
female employee, Burton, to work full-time as a word processor. The
plaintiff noticed events that led her to believe that the defendant was
romantically interested in Burton. The plaintiff stated that she observed the
defendant employer looking down Burton’s low-cut blouse, following her
movements as she left the premises, and blowing her kisses across the
office.111 Furthermore, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant and Burton
attended a private birthday lunch and had “clandestine meetings” in and out
of the office.112 The plaintiff stated that she overheard the defendant telling
Burton during the company Christmas party that she was beautiful.113
Finally, the plaintiff stated that the defendant gave Burton a Christmas gift
and a larger year-end bonus than any other employee.114 Plaintiff’s
employment was terminated after she reported the behaviors she observed
to the defendant’s wife.115
isolated instance of favoritism towards a ‘paramour’ (or a spouse, or a
friend) may be unfair, but it does not discriminate against women or men in
violation of Title VII, since both a disadvantaged for reasons other than their
genders. A female charging party who is denied an employment benefit
because of such sexual favoritism would not have been treated more
favorably had she been a man, nor conversely, was she treated less favorably
because she was a woman.
EEOC NOTICE N-915-050, supra note 12. See Proksel, 41 Cal. App. at 1630 (stating,
“where . . . there is no conduct other than favoritism towards paramour, the overwhelming
weight of authority holds that no claim of sexual harassment or discrimination exists.”).
108. See EEOC NOTICE N-915-050, supra note 12 (noting that a “a female charging party
who is denied an employment benefit because of such sexual favoritism would not have
been treated more favorably had she been a man, nor, conversely, was she treated less
favorably because she was a woman.”); Miller v. Aluminum Co. of America, 679 F. Supp.
495, 499 (W.D. Pa. 1988); King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
109. Proksel v. Gattis, 41 Cal. App. 4th 1626, 1630 n. 5 (1996) (citing Fisher v. San Pedro
Peninsula Hosp., 214 Cal. App. 3d 590, 610 (1989)).
110. Proksel, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1628.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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The majority of the plaintiff’s claims were dismissed by the trial
court.116 Then, during the trial for breach of the implied promise that she
would not be terminated except for good cause, the jury found that plaintiff
was an at-will employee and entered judgment in favor of the defendant.117
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in granting
summary adjudication as to her statutory and common law claims of sexual
discrimination and sexual harassment based on FEHA and the public policy
of the state.118
The appellate court disagreed and upheld the lower court’s decision,
holding that there was insufficient evidence presented of sexual harassment or
hostile work environment because the plaintiff produced proof only of isolated
instances of favoritism towards the defendant.119 The plaintiff must show a
“concerted pattern of harassment of a repeated, routine, or a generalized nature
by the defendant.”120 According to the court, the defendant’s flattering
remarks about the new coworker, his favoritism towards her, and the kiss she
blew at him did not meet the required standard for recovery.121
The Proksel decision thus reinforces that a plaintiff’s recovery depends on
an ability to provide evidence of a “repeated, routine, or generalized” level of
egregious or frequent romantic behavior between a superior and a subordinate
co-worker.122 Isolated instances, even when they raise the inference of
favoritism to the paramour in the office setting, per Proksel decision are not
enough for a third-party claimant to succeed. Under Title VII and Proksel
decision isolated favoritism towards a paramour, although may be unfair,
“does not discriminate against women or men in violation of Title VII, since
both are disadvantaged for reasons other than their genders.”123
2. Favoritism Based on Coerced Sexual Conduct
A second category of sexual favoritism, coerced sexual conduct, is
also known as quid pro quo sexual harassment. It is actionable under
116. Proksel, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1629 (noting that the plaintiff alleged causes of action for
breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud and
deceit, sex discrimination and wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. On
summary judgment, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s sex discrimination and public policy
causes of action. Following the plaintiff’s opening statements, the defendant’s motion for
non-suit was granted as to the plaintiff’s fraud and deceit cause of action. The trial court
dismissed the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant acted in bad faith as redundant, and only
allowed the plaintiff to pursue her claim for breach of an implied promise that she would not
be terminated except for good cause.).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1630 n. 5.
121. Id. at 1631.
122. Proksel, 41 Cal. App. 4th at 1631. See also Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 214
Cal. App. 3d 590, 610 (1989); Downes v. F.A.A., 775 F.2d 288, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(abrogated on other grounds); Harris, 510 U.S. 17.
123. Proksel, 41 Cal. App. at 1631.
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Title VII.124 This type of favoritism occurs when an employee is
“coerced into submitting to unwelcome sexual advances in return for a
job benefit.”125 As a result, other co-workers who were qualified for but
did not receive the benefit may be able to establish that the sexual
relationship was generally made a condition for receiving the benefit.126
Evidence of such a precondition may support a claim of a hostile work
environment in violation of Title VII.127
For example, in Toscano v. Nimmo, a Delaware court found a Title VII
violation where the granting of sexual favors was a condition for
promotion.128 A female employee alleged that her application for a
particular position in the hospital was denied due to unlawful
discrimination because the promotion was granted to a co-worker who was
having a consensual sexual affair with the supervisor.129 The plaintiff
claimed that the co-worker’s affair with the supervisor won the co-worker
preferential treatment and promotion.130
In rendering its decision, the court considered evidence of sexually
suggestive telephone calls made by the supervisor to female employees at
their home telephone numbers, descriptions of the supervisor’s alleged
“sexual encounters” with subordinate female employees, and the
supervisor’s exhibition of “suggestive behavior at work.”131 The court
stated that the supervisor failed to keep his work and private life separate
and that the promotion of an employee who had granted him sexual favors
was consistent with his documented behaviors. After the complaint was
filed charging that the promotion was based on favoritism, the supervisor
made harassing telephone calls to plaintiff’s work and home numbers
asking her to stop complaining about his relationship with the co-worker.132
Further, the court established that the supervisor withheld from the plaintiff
information that she needed to work effectively, that he changed her typical
job assignments, and that as a result she was transferred to a lower rank
position.133
The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, finding that her co-worker
entered into the affair to obtain the promotion. The court further held that
sexual favors played a role in promotion selection, that the plaintiff was
better qualified for the position, and that the supervisor harassed the

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See EEOC NOTICE N-915-050, supra note 12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Toscano, 570 F. Supp. at 1204.
Id. at 1198.
Id.
Id. at 1200.
Id. at 1205.
Id. at 1206.
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plaintiff.134 This, in the court’s view, violated the plaintiff’s Title VII
rights because the sexual favors appeared to aid the co-worker in receiving
a promotion, even if, as the court found, the affair was consensual.135
Toscano thus demonstrates that a third party may bring a claim and prevail
against the employer under Title VII when the employer is engaged in a
sexual relationship with a co-worker where sexual favoritism is the basis
for awarding the co-worker a promotion.136
3. Widespread Favoritism Affecting Third Parties
According to EEOC Policy Guidance and case law, if favoritism based
upon sexual favors is widespread in a workplace, employees who do not
welcome this conduct can bring a hostile environment claim.137 A party
may file a lawsuit without being a direct target of sexual conduct, and
without deciding whether those who received favorable treatment willfully
provided the sexual favors.138
In Broderick v. Ruder, a female employee filed a Title VII claim
against the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) after five years
of employment with the agency.139 The plaintiff, an attorney in the
Enforcement Division, worked at various times for five different
supervisors.140 During the entire period, she received only one promotion,
even though she was eligible for two more due to her length of service.141
During the trial, the plaintiff testified that persons in managerial positions
caused an “atmosphere of sexual harassment[,]” which other witnesses
corroborated.142
In one example of that atmosphere, the plaintiff testified about
supervisor conduct. She stated that during her first week on the job, the
company Brand Chief repeatedly asked her to accept his offer for a ride
home, and another superior kissed her at a company party.143 However,
134. Toscano, 570 F. Supp. at 1200–04.
135. Id.
136. Id. See also Mitchell Poole, Paramours, Promotions, and Sexual Favoritism: Unfair,
but is There Liability, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 819, 834–35 (1998).
137. See EEOC NOTICE N-915-050, supra note 12.
138. Id. See Mary Kate Sheridan, Just Because It’s Sex Doesn’t Mean It’s Because of Sex:
The Need for New Legislation to Target Sexual Favoritism, 40 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS.
379 (2007).
139. See Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1270 (where the Plaintiff asserted that defendant,
chairman of SEC, was responsible for creating and refusing to remedy a sexually hostile
work environment at the regional SEC office, and that plaintiff’s supervisors retaliated
against her for opposing the actions of her managers that she considered to be illegal under
Title VII.).
140. Id.
141. Id. (stating that during the Plaintiff’s employment at the SEC’s Enforcement Division
she received one promotion to grade 13, step 1. However, due to the length of her service,
the plaintiff met eligibility qualifications for promotion to grades 14 and 15.).
142. Id. at 1272.
143. Id.
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other relevant incidents that occurred during that period were not
personally directed at the plaintiff and were not quid pro quo exchange of
sexual favors for job benefits.144
The court disregarded her superiors’ direct approaches, and instead
held that the sexually hostile work environment was created by other events
that happened during plaintiff’s employment.145 On one occasion, a male
Regional Administrator, intoxicated at a work party, untied plaintiff’s
sweater, kissed the plaintiff, and kissed another female employee.146 At
another work-related occasion, the same Regional Administrator put his
hands on the hips of an administrative assistant and made a comment that
she had “sexy, wide hips.”147 Additionally, the plaintiff attested that the
Regional Assistant and Regional Trial Counsel made sexually themed
comments regarding her dress and body.148
The second example of an atmosphere of sexual harassment included a
married male Branch Chief who admitted to having an affair with his female
secretary from December 1981 to June 1984; this affair was known around
the department.149 During the time of the affair, his secretary paramour was
promoted three times, received an acclamation, and two cash awards.150 The
Branch Chief noted that although he was not the secretary’s supervisor, he
provided “direct input” into her performance evaluations.151 Despite his
conduct, the Branch Chief was never disciplined and had his salary increased
ten times between October 1983 and January 1987.152
A third example of the atmosphere of sexual harassment involved a male
Assistant Regional Administrator (“ARA”) for the Enforcement Division and
his subordinate female employee. Although there was no direct evidence that
the two were engaged in a sexual relationship, the plaintiff presented evidence
showing that ARA was “noticeably attracted” to his subordinate female
employee. Further, evidence was presented that both ARA and the subordinate
spent time socializing at and outside of the workplace during business hours. It
was undisputed that during a period of just over two years, the ARA
significantly advanced the subordinate’s career.153
Finally, the plaintiff supported her claim by presenting “compelling
evidence” of a sexual relationship between the ARA for the Regulation
Division (“ARA-RD”) and his female associate.154 Witnesses testified that

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1273.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1274.
Id.
Id.
Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1274.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the ARA-RD and the associate socialized together by having extended
lunches, going out for dinner and drinks, and were seen jogging as a pair.155
During a National Secretaries Week luncheon, the female associate became
inebriated and the ARA-RD helped her by accompanying her home.156 The
ARA-RD also traveled on a business trip with his female associate and the
two shared a hotel room.157 During the time of her employment, the female
associate quickly advanced with the assistance of the ARA-RD. The
associate was promoted twice over the period of a year, received a $300
award, and was highly reviewed with perfect marks in her employee
evaluation.158
The court concluded that the evidence presented at trial established
“conduct of a sexual nature was so pervasive” at the department that it
created “a hostile or offensive work environment which affected the
motivation and work performance of those who found such conduct
repugnant and offensive.”159 The court stated that the plaintiff was
obligated to work in a setting where managers, by their actions, mistreated
her and other female staff members when they showed favoritism towards
other women who engaged in sexual conduct with them.160 The plaintiff
was negatively affected by the favoritism at her workplace, which lowered
her motivation and affected her job performance, taking away opportunities
for career advancement from her and other female staff members.161 The
case presented to the court distinctly showed that the plaintiff and other
female coworkers felt the “sexual conduct and its accompanying
manifestations . . . to be offensive.”162
Miller v. Department of Corrections provides another example where a
court held that a superior who showed favoritism towards his subordinate
employees created a hostile work environment.163 Two former employees
at the California Valley State Prison for Women, Miller and Mackey, filed
a sexual harassment lawsuit164 alleging that their superior, Kuykendall, who
155. Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1274.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1274–75 (noting that in this circumstance the ARA denied the occurrence of
inappropriate sexual behavior and stated that the time was spent discussing female
employee’s personal life issues and “theological problems.”).
158. Id. at 1275.
159. Id. at 1278.
160. Id.
161. Broderick, 685 F. Supp. at 1278.
162. Id. (noting that “plaintiff and other women were for obvious reasons reluctant to
voice their displeasure and, when they did, they were treated with a hostile response by . . .
the management team.”).
163. See Miller, 36 Cal. 4th at 446.
164. Id. at 450 (noting that the FEHA expressly prohibits sexual harassment in the
workplace. Under FEHA, it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to harass an
employee because of sex.). See Cal. Gov’t Code §12940(j)(1)-(4)(C) (West 2015) (noting that
under FEHA, sexual harassment of an employee by another employee, “other than an agent or
supervisor, shall be unlawful if the entity, or its agents or supervisors, knows or should have
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was a chief deputy warden of the prison, showed favoritism towards female
employees who had sexual relationships with him.165
Testimony showed that, in 1994, Miller overheard from other employees
that Kuykendall was having sexual relationship with three different female
subordinates: Patrick, Brown, and Bibb.166 During the time of these
relationships, all three received job benefits, including transfers, promotions,
special assignments, and other work privileges. Moreover, the women
bragged to co-workers about their power to control the warden and their
enjoyment of the additional benefits he bestowed upon them.
For instance, Miller was on a committee that assessed Bibb’s
application for a promotion. Kuykendall conceded that he had sexual
relations with Bibb, which was corroborated by other witnesses.167 If
granted, the promotion would have transferred Bibb from a different
facility to a position that was under Kuykendall’s direct supervision.168
After Bibb’s application for promotion was denied, Miller and other
committee members were informed that Kuykendall ordered them to grant
Bibb the promotion.169 As a result, Bibb was awarded the promotion and

known of this conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.” The
term “‘harassment’ . . . includes sexual harassment, gender harassment, and harassment based
on pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.”).
165. Miller, 36 Cal. 4th at 450.
166. Id. at 452 (Kuykendall was having sexual affairs with his secretary (Bibb),
subordinate associate warden (Patrick), and department employee (Brown).). See id. at 455
(“Plaintiffs presented evidence that the three women who were having sexual affairs with
Kuykendall—Patrick, Bibb, and Brown—squabbled over him, sometimes in emotional
scenes witnessed by other employees, including Miller.”). See also id. at 458 (One
correctional employee commented on his wife’s difficulties with the employment conditions
at her department: “the sexual relationships Kuykendall was having with Bibb and Brown”
were creating an “impossible environment” for his wife to work in.).
167. Id. at 454–55. (“Kuykendall conceded he had danced with Bibb at work-related
social gatherings and there was evidence that he telephoned her at home hundreds of times
from his workplace. Employees, including Mackey and Miller, witnessed Bibb and
Kuykendall fondling each other on at least three occasions at work-related social gatherings
occurring between 1991 and 1998 where employees of the institution were present. One
Department employee, Phyllis Mellott, also complained that at such a gathering Kuykendall
had put his arms around her and another employee and made unwelcome groping gestures.
Kuykendall was present with Bibb in 1998 when she was arrested for driving under the
influence of alcohol, a circumstance of which Miller and other employees were aware.
Kuykendall failed to initiate an internal affairs investigation concerning the incident or
report his own involvement.”)
168. Id. at 452.
169. Id. at 452–453 (“When the interviewing panel did not select Bibb, Miller and other
members of the panel were informed by an associate warden that Kuykendall wanted them
to ‘make it happen.’” Miller declared: “This was . . . the first of many incidents which
caused me to lose faith in the system . . . and to feel somewhat powerless because of
Kuykendall and his sexual relations with subordinates.” Further, “there was evidence Bibb
had bragged to plaintiff Mackey of her power over the warden, and a departmental internal
affairs investigation later concluded that Kuykendall’s personal relationship with Bibb
rendered his involvement in her promotion unethical.”).
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transfer. In addition, Patrick was also awarded a transfer to the facility
where Kuykendall was a warden and “enjoyed unusual privileges such as
having to report directly to Kuykendall rather than to her immediate
superior.”170
In another occurrence, Brown won promotions over other employees
due to her romantic relationship with Kuykendall.171 In 1995, both Brown
and the plaintiff Miller applied for a temporary job as facility captain.
Brown announced to Miller that she had an advantage over Miller and
would receive the job.172 Kuykendall served on the interview panel and
granted Brown the promotion, “despite Miller’s higher rank, superior
education, and greater experience.”173 Brown’s promotion surprised other
employees and officers involved in the selection process because they had
recommended Miller: They have referred to Brown’s selection as
“unfair.”174
Later, when Miller and Brown competed for promotion to a permanent
facility position, and Brown again received the promotion.175 Within a year
and a half, Brown was promoted to the position of associate warden, two
ranks above entry level.176 Kuykendall was on the interview panel during
the selection process.177 The speed of Brown’s promotions within the ranks
was “unusually rapid” and viewed negatively by other employees.178
Employees who attempted to rectify favoritism by reporting the sexual
affairs were punished or subjected to an abusive work environment. For
instance, plaintiff Mackey worked as a records manager and received

170. Miller, 36 Cal. 4th at 453.
171. Id. (Brown admitted to having an affair with Kuykendall after Miller confronted
her.). See also id. at 457 (Plaintiff Mackey was aware of Kuykendall’s sexual affairs with
Bibb and Brown.).
172. Id. 4th at 467 (stating that Brown announced to Miller that Kuykendall would be
forced to give her, Brown, the promotion or she would “take him down” with her
knowledge of “every scar on his body.”).
173. Id. at 453–54 (noting that the Departmental Internal Affairs investigation report “later
called Kuykendall’s conduct unethical because of his sexual relationship with Brown.”
Further, the internal affairs report noted that, as to Bibb and Brown, “[b]oth relationships
were viewed by staff as unethical from a business practice standpoint and one [sic] that
created a hostile working environment.” During his investigation, the internal affairs
investigator “encountered several employees who believed that persons who had sexual
affairs with Kuykendall received special employment benefits.”).
174. Id. at 454 (stating that employees attributed Brown’s promotion to her sexual affair
with Kuykendall and believed that Brown was unqualified for the position); see also id. at
458 (stating that “Mackey was certain that Brown was promoted to the position of associate
warden not because of merit, but because of her sexual affair with Kuykendall.”).
175. Id.
176. Miller, 36 Cal. 4th at 454.
177. Id.
178. Id. (noting that other employees were outraged at the pace of Brown’s promotions
and complained that to achieve higher-ranking positions they would have to “F [their] way
to the top.”).
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inmate pay, which was comprised of enhanced salary benefits.179 After
Mackey complained to Kuykendall about his sexual relations with Brown,
Mackey’s supplemental pay was withdrawn and she was subjected to
demeaning humiliation and verbal abuse in front of the coworkers.180
Mackey testified that her job responsibilities changed after she complained
to an internal affairs investigator that she was denied opportunities for
promotion.181 She further testified that she was eventually forced to
resign182 and that she believed she was not promoted because she did not
have sex with Kuykendall.183
Similarly, plaintiff Miller’s working environment became intolerable
after she complained of sexual affairs between Kuykendall and his
This was evidenced in the reduction of Miller’s
subordinates.184
supervisory responsibilities, imposition of additional duties, added criticism
of her performance, cancellation of accommodations that Miller had been
granted for her physical conditions, interference with her work, and the
physical assault and false imprisonment of Miller by Brown.185
In light of these facts, the court concluded that widespread sexual
favoritism existed at the correctional facility and caused a hostile working
environment for its employees.186 The court referenced the evidence of
widespread favoritism, which included “admissions by the participants
179. Miller, 36 Cal. 4th at 458.
180. Id. (noting that “Mackey claimed Brown demeaned her in the presence of other
employees and impeded the execution of Mackey’s duties in various respects, and stating
that ‘[t]his situation created hostility among the employees in [Mackey’s] Department.’”).
Brown repeatedly interrogated Mackey about her statements to the internal affairs
investigator and attempted to contact Mackey outside of work. Stress led to health
problems, and as a result, Mackey was unable to work between August 1998 and January
1999. Upon her return to work, Mackey was demoted and suffered further mistreatment and
humiliation. Id. at 459.
181. Id.
182. Id. (noting that “Kuykendall subsequently reduced [Mackey’s] responsibilities and
denied her access to the work experience she needed in order to be promoted to the position
of correctional counselor”); see id. (noting that “[a] few months later she resigned, finding
the conditions of employment intolerable.”).
183. Miller, 36 Cal. 4th at 459.
184. Id. at 455 (stating that according to Miller, after she complained to Kuykendall, chief
deputy warden Yamamoto and Brown made criticisms of her work, and threatened her with
reprisals when she complained to Kuykendall about their interference).
185. Id. at 455–57.
186. Id. at 470–71 (“There was evidence of considerable flaunting of the relationships
affecting the workplace, consisting of Bibb and Brown’s bragging and the jealous scenes
between these two women, along with Kuykendall’s indiscreet behavior at a number of
work-related social gatherings. The favoritism that ensued from the sexual affairs also was
on public display, reflected in Kuykendall’s permitting Brown to abuse plaintiffs, his
directive to the interview committee to promote Bibb, and his repeated admissions that he
would not or could not control Brown because of his sexual relationship with her. It may
even be inferred that Kuykendall solicited sexual favors in return for employment benefits,
in light of Bibb and Brown’s boasts, the sequence of promotions awarded by Kuykendall,
and his comment to Miller, ‘I should have chose[n] you.’”)
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concerning the nature of the relationships, boasting by the favored women,
eyewitness accounts of incidents of public fondling, repeated promotion
despite lack of qualifications, and Kuykendall’s admission [that] he could
not control Brown because of his sexual relationship with her . . .”187
Both Broderick and Miller suggest that to establish a hostile
environment claim as a violation of Title VII, favoritism in the workplace
must be widespread, based on sexual favors, and directed toward
employees who do not welcome this conduct. These cases suggest that
widespread favoritism exists when conduct of a sexual nature is so
pervasive as to affect the motivation and work performance of employees,
where evidence of public displays of affections is present, and where
promotions are awarded for sexual favors.
B. TRADITIONAL THIRD-PARTY SEXUAL HARASSMENT THEORIES
Third-party sexual harassment involves a situation where the plaintiff
is not a direct target of the harassment but is subjected to a work
atmosphere where such harassment, even if directed towards others, is
severe or pervasive.188 The plaintiff’s employment conditions may be
affected even if the conduct is not extreme, is welcomed by participants,
and is not directed toward the plaintiff. Such a situation could involve a
work environment where employees engage in sexual joking or banter that
may prove offensive to parties who witness the conversation.189
Just because some employees in the workplace do not find the specific
conduct objectionable does not insulate the employer from potential liability to
an individual employee who is reasonably offended by the conduct.190 For
instance, in McLaughlin v. Governor’s Office of Employee Relations, a male
employee’s statements that a female co-worker wanted to be a veterinarian
because she was “into dogs” and “screwing animals” supported a viable hostile

187. Miller, 36 Cal. 4th at 471.
188. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67 (noting that “[f]or sexual harassment to be
actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s
employment and create an abusive working environment.”).
189. See, e.g., Hall v. Bodine Elec. Co., 276 F.3d 345, 359 (7th Cir. 2002) overruled on
other grounds by Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Even if we assume that
[plaintiff’s] tawdry conduct did not amount to Title VII sexual harassment, [defendant] was
still permitted to terminate her. In fact, the company’s failure to do so would have most
likely constituted a Title VII violation . . . , as well as subjecting the company to future
liability if another complaint of harassment was filed against [plaintiff].”)
190. See Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 854–57 (3d Cir. 1990)
(“Plaintiff’s discrimination claim alleges that her conditions of employment were
impermissibly harmed by the open [and consensual] sexual relationship, between her
supervisor and one of her co-workers, which created a hostile and sexually-charged work
environment from which she suffered because of her sex.”).
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environment claim.191 Additionally, the display or dissemination of sexual
visual materials in the workplace may create a hostile work environment.192
Liability may exist where an employer is aware or should be aware of the
hostile work environment caused by a non-supervisor employee.193 Such
knowledge of a hostile work environment may exist where a supervisor or an
employer’s agent observes or learns of the prohibited behavior.194 However,
lack of direct notification regarding hostile work environment does not
mitigate liability.195 Where employees and supervisors are aware of the
harassment, it can be expected that the employer should have had knowledge
of the conduct.196
Conduct not specifically directed toward the offended employee can
have the same consequence as if it was addressed to that person.197 Courts
also consider evidence of other acts of harassment of which a plaintiff
becomes aware during the period of his or her employment, even if the
other acts were directed at someone other than the plaintiff and did not
happen in the plaintiff’s presence.198
A third-party employee may also have a retaliation claim of action
against an employer if the plaintiff complained about an interoffice
romance to the employer and the employer took adverse action against the
employee.199 For instance, in Reginelli v. Motion Industries, Inc., the
plaintiff was awarded $953,214 in damages for wrongful termination when
he was fired after reporting a reasonably suspicious sexual relationship
between a male supervisor and a subordinate female employee.200
C.

EMERGING SEX-PLUS THEORY

Proving the occurrence of sexual harassment has long been considered
essential to a successful claim of sexual favoritism.201 This requirement is
191. See McLaughlin v. Governor’s Office of Employee Relations, 739 F. Supp. 97, 101–
104 (N.D.N.Y 1990).
192. See Rhodes v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 243 F. Supp. 2d 810, 821–22 (N.D. Ill. 2003)
(noting that although the claim was dismissed on a summary judgment motion, the court
sympathized with the plaintiff because “it appeared” that the plaintiff “worked in a sexually
tinged environment that is wholly inappropriate in modern-day workplaces.”).
193. BRUCE HARRISON, ET AL., SHAWE & ROSENTHAL, 1-25 EMPLOYMENT LAW DESKBOOK
§ 25.02(2)(c)(ii) (2008); Drinkwater, 904 F.2d at 854; Rhodes, 243 F. Supp. at 820; Fleenor
v. Hewitt Soap Co., 81 F.3d 48, 50 (6th Cir. Ohio 1996).
194. EMPLOYMENT LAW DESKBOOK § 25.02(2)(c)(ii); Fleenor, 81 F.3d at 50.
195. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 72 (1986) (stating that an “absence of notice to an
employer does not necessarily insulate that employer from liability”).
196. EMPLOYMENT LAW DESKBOOK § 25.02(2)(c)(ii).
197. EMPLOYMENT LAW DESKBOOK § 25.02(2)(a)(i).
198. Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 335 (6th Cir. 2008).
199. Reginelli v. Motion Indus., Inc., 987 F. Supp. 1137, 1138 (1997).
200. Id.
201. EEOC NOTICE N-915.048, supra note 102 (noting that to bring a claim of sexual
favoritism, the plaintiff must provide evidence of either quid pro quo sexual harassment or a
hostile work environment based on sexual harassment).
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a high hurdle for a plaintiff, because claims are often based on isolated
instances of inappropriate behavior that, because they do not represent a
pattern of behavior, have been associated with consensual sexual
Consequently, courts have
relationships rather than harassment.202
generally precluded recourse on a theory of sexual favoritism, and instead
burdened plaintiffs with the extremely high standard of proving that they
were denied employment rights because of a sexually charged hostile work
environment that was simultaneously damaging to other employees.203
A “sex-plus” theory offers plaintiffs an alternative. Under the sex-plus
theory, a plaintiff (usually a woman) must show that she was discriminated
against because of her gender in conjunction with a second characteristic.204
Examples of bases for sex-plus claims include discrimination based on sex
plus a personal relationship,205 sex plus marital status,206 sex plus
fertility,207 sex plus pregnancy,208 sex plus children,209 and sex plus gender
stereotypes.210 Under this theory, there is no need to establish the existence
of a hostile work environment.
The Supreme Court has ruled that when sex is considered in
conjunction with a second characteristic, the sex-plus theory allows
additional narrowly defined groups to assert claims that would not
otherwise be protected by Title VII.211 This sex-plus concept was applied
in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., where the defendant refused to hire
women who had children in pre-school but not men who had children in
pre-school.212 The Supreme Court found no general bias against women by
the defendant, specifically pointing to evidence that more than seventy-five
percent of open positions had been filled by women.213 The Court held that
the usage of different criteria for hiring men and women for the same job
nonetheless violated Title VII.214
Under a sex-plus theory, “the threshold question for sexual favoritism
would not be whether an individual consented to or was coerced into a sexual

202. See Harvey v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 961 F. Supp. 1017, 1029 (S.D. Tex. 1997)
(stating that “[a]lleged favoritism to a paramour generally has been held not to constitute
discrimination in violation of Title VII because the alleged discrimination is not based on
the plaintiff’s gender.”).
203. See Perry v. Harris Cherin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1013 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that the
workplace must be “hellish” to be actionable).
204. Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 F.3d 1420, 1433 (2d Cir. 1995).
205. Coleman v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 108 F.3d 1199, 1202 n.1 (10th Cir. 1997).
206. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971).
207. Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 198 (1991).
208. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 670 (1983).
209. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971).
210. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
211. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 542.
212. Id. at 543.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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relationship . . . but were gender and a sexual relationship the motivating factor
in the employer’s decision to promote one employee over the other?”215

IV. MITIGATING RISK AND PREVENTING HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENTS
An employer must take affirmative and appropriate action to keep the
workplace from deteriorating into a hostile work environment that
victimizes employees, damages the company’s performance and reputation,
and exposes it to lawsuits and large jury awards. Employers may avoid
hostile work environments and shield themselves from exposure to legal
liability by establishing and implementing a proper plan of action,
preventing unacceptable incidents of employee behavior, and acting in a
measured and appropriate manner in response to claims of sexual
harassment or hostile work environment.216
Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment,217
and employers must initiate preventative measures in an informed way. To
prevent sexual harassment from occurring in the workplace and to
minimize any harm that does occur, employers should inform employees
about the subject of sexual harassment at the work place; express strong
and absolute disapproval, establish work policies to address sexual
harassment issues that accurately comply with the law; implement
appropriate sanctions for breach of policies; and develop methods to
sensitize all employees, including supervisors, managers, and officers, to
sexual harassment issues.218 The impact of sexual harassment on third
parties requires special attention. It is important that all employees are
aware that disruptive behavior in the workplace damages both the
individuals directly involved, and other employees who nevertheless
experience disruption even if not the intended victims of sexual
harassment, widespread favoritism, or sexual discrimination.
In the remainder of this section, we will discuss the central role and
importance of an employer’s formal statement of its sexual harassment
policy. We will give special attention to two related topics for a company to
215. See Susan J. Best, Sexual Favoritism: A Cause of Action Under a “Sex-Plus” Theory,
30 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 211, 232 (2009). See also Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544 (declaring sex-plus
a form of sex discrimination under Title VII).
216. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (2004).
217. Id.
218. Id. See C. M. Hunt, et al., supra note 15, at 661 (stating that organizations should
implement policies that are “based on empowerment, encouraging the resistance of sexual
harassment through the formal support of victims and the unconditional punishment of
perpetrators.”); Ashby Jones & Nathan Koppel, Plenty of Company: Lapses Felled A Long
List Of Top Executives, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2010, at A.10 (noting that “Steven J. Heyer was
ousted as chief executive of Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide Inc. in 2007, after the
board of directors received an anonymous letter accusing him of creating a hostile work
environment. The letter alleged that Mr. Heyer made inappropriate physical contact with a
female employee outside a restaurant bathroom, on at least one occasion.”).
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consider in developing its complaint procedure and in preparing to conduct
internal investigations of formal charges of a hostile work environment.
A. POLICY STATEMENT
A policy statement is the cornerstone of an employer’s efforts to
prevent sexual harassment at the workplace.219 This written document puts
all employees on notice that the employer actively seeks to identify and
eliminate all instances of workplace sexual harassment.220 The EEOC
suggests that an effective complaint procedure “encourage[s] employees to
report harassing conduct before it becomes severe or pervasive.”221 If an
employee promptly utilizes the procedure, the employer can usually stop
harassment before actionable harm occurs.222 A carefully formulated and
implemented sexual harassment policy statement helps provide a necessary
defense against claims for liability and punitive damages in the event that
harassment occurs.223 The absence of antiharassment policies will make it
difficult for an employer to prove in any litigation that it exercised
reasonable care to prevent or correct the harassment.224
A general policy pledging a nondiscriminatory workplace is
insufficient to satisfy the expectation of an employer’s reasonable care. To
minimize liability and provide meaningful protection for employees,
employers should have a sexual harassment policy in place that includes
five elements: a clear policy statement, an effective complaint procedure,
an effective policy distribution plan, education and training for all
employees, and a system for timely investigations and corrective action.
A company’s policy statement on sexual harassment must include a
bold and direct statement of the company’s intolerance and prohibition of
any form of sexual harassment. In addition, a company’s sexual
harassment statement must be clear, emphatic, easily understood, free of
219. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) (noting that “Title
VII is designed to encourage the creation of anti-harassment policies and effective grievance
mechanisms.”).
220. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: VICARIOUS
EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS, EEOC NOTICE NO.
915.002 (Jun. 18, 1999), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html
(hereinafter “EEOC NOTICE 915.002”).
221. Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 764.
222. Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 168 F.3d 795, 803 (5th Cir. 1999) (“this case
demonstrates why, as a practical matter, inappropriate sexual conduct will virtually never
rise to the level of actionability when an employer takes . . . prompt remedial action”).
223. See Kolstad v. ADA, 527 U.S. 526 (1999) (noting that in the context of punitive
damages, it is insufficient to show that certain individuals have exhibited the malice or
reckless indifference required under the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The plaintiff-employee
must impute liability for punitive damages to the employer under the principles of agency
law, and an employer may not be held vicariously liable for the discriminatory employment
decisions of managerial agents where those decisions are contrary to the employer’s goodfaith efforts to comply with Title VII.).
224. EEOC NOTICE 915.002, supra note 220.
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confusing legal terms, and provide examples of conduct targeted for
immediate elimination. There should be a full description of behaviors that
are covered by the sexual harassment label and a substantial list of specific
behaviors that are prohibited. At the same time, the policy should state that
the list is only a representative, and not exhaustive, sample of all possible
violations.225
Since liability for harassment may occur outside of work or regular
working hours, employers should extend the policy to include employee
activities that are conducted via social media, email, and the Internet, and
provide guidelines to shape employee activity therein, which may create a
hostile work environment.226 The inclusion of social media and Internet
policy into this statement is important, since forty-three percent of surveyed
employees believe that receiving unsolicited and sexually explicit email
can be severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment and
constitute sexual harassment.227
225. EEOC NOTICE 915.002, supra note 220 (suggesting that “[t]he policy and complaint
procedure should be written in a way that will be understood by all employees in the
employer’s workforce. Other measures to ensure effective dissemination of the policy and
complaint procedure include posting them in central locations and incorporating them into
employee handbooks. If feasible, the employer should provide training to all employees to
ensure that they understand their rights and responsibilities. An anti-harassment policy and
complaint procedure should contain, at a minimum, the following elements: (1) A clear
explanation of prohibited conduct; (2) Assurance that employees who make complaints of
harassment or provide information related to such complaints will be protected against
retaliation; (3) A clearly described complaint process that provides accessible avenues of
complaint; (4) Assurance that the employer will protect the confidentiality of harassment
complaints to the extent possible; (5) A complaint process that provides a prompt,
thorough, and impartial investigation; and (6) Assurance that the employer will take
immediate and appropriate corrective action when it determines that harassment has
occurred.”). See also Montero v. AGCO Corp., 192 F.3d 856, 862 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating
that “[t]he policy (1) provides a definition of sexual harassment, (2) identifies whom
employees should contact if they are subjected to sexual harassment, (3) describes the
disciplinary measures that the company may use in a harassment case, and (4) provides a
statement that retaliation will not be tolerated.”).
226. Tamara E. Russell, Employment Law Meets Social Media: Advice for Employers,
BNA – HR FOCUS (Oct. 2011), http://www.uslawwatch.com/2011/08/16/privacy/bnainsights-employmentlabor-law-meets-social-media-advice-employers/ (last visited Feb. 17,
2015). See Nelson & Simek, supra note 69, at HT 11 (stating that a policy should instruct
employees to “avoid controversial subjects, use a polite and respectful tone, even when
disagreeing, [and] never post anything that could conceivably be construed as
discrimination, harassment, or defamation.” The author also suggests that “[a] well-crafted
policy should: (1) Address all potential pitfalls in a clear and organization-specific manner
and be consistent with the other organization policies and procedures; (2) Distinguish
between business and personal use (on-the-job and off-the-job conduct); (3) Inform
employees of the rules and regulations that state they will have a reduced or non-existent
expectation of privacy on any of the organization-provided computers, e-mail systems,
mobile devices, and telephone or voice systems; and (4) Encompass what can be said, who
can say it, and the manner in which things should be said.”)
227. See Ben Dahl, A Further Darkside to Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail? An
Assessment of Potential Employer Liability for Spam E-Mail, 22 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER
& INFO. L. 179, 192 (2003).
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The mere publication of a sexual harassment policy will not insulate
the employer from liability.228 To put employees properly on notice, the
policy should be clearly communicated to employees and discussed with
supervisory and nonsupervisory personnel.229 To be optimally effective,
any sexual harassment policy should be distributed in writing, to all
employees, on multiple occasions, with an acknowledgement from each
employee that the policy was received, read, and understood.230 An
employee’s written acknowledgement of her receipt of the policy and
knowledge of its contents are helpful to rebut harassment claims against the
employer.231
Furthermore, both supervisory and nonsupervisory employees need to
be educated, trained, and reminded about the company’s workplace sexual
harassment policy. Even when an employee receives a copy of the sexual
harassment policy when first hired, subsequent training sessions are
important to ensure that employees remain aware of the details of the
policy and their roles in preventing and reporting claims.
B. COMPLAINT PROCEDURE
A policy statement may be more effective if employees feel minimally
intimidated when reporting violations.232 The policy statement must
228. Harbison v. Pilot Air Freight, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5024, *76 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 16,
2001) (quoting Bruso v. United Airlines, Inc., 239 F.3d 848, 858 (7th Cir. 2000) (“although
the implementation of a written or formal antidiscrimination policy is relevant to evaluating
an employer’s good faith efforts at Title VII compliance, it is not sufficient in and of itself to
insulate an employer from a punitive damages award.”)); see Hurley v. Atlantic City Police
Dep’t, 174 F.3d 95, 118 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Ellerth and Faragher do not, as the defendants
seem to assume, focus mechanically on the formal existence of a sexual harassment policy,
allowing an absolute defense to a hostile work environment claim whenever the employer
can point to an anti-harassment policy of some sort.”).
229. EEOC NOTICE 915.002, supra note 220 (stating that “[a]n employer should provide
every employee with a copy of the policy and complaint procedure, and redistribute it
periodically.”).
230. John A. Pearce II & Samuel A. DiLullo, A Business Policy Statement Model for
Eliminating Sexual Harassment and Related Employer Liability, 66 S.A.M. ADVANCED
MGMT. J. 12–21 (2001) (stating that distribution should take place at the time of initial
hiring, with subsequent distributions thereafter. Employee handbooks, annual performance
reviews, periodic training sessions, company newsletters, and manuals all provide
opportunities to redistribute the policy to ensure awareness by all employees. Permanent
and prominent placement of the harassment policy on a bulletin board and the company
computer network can also be effective. In addition, employers should appoint
knowledgeable individuals generally available in a confidential setting to respond to
employee questions concerning the policy. Since some employees may not speak and read
English well, the policy should be written in as many languages as will be sufficient to
ensure the comprehension of all employees.).
231. Id. (suggesting that after it is signed and detached from the employee’s copy of the
policy statement, the written notice pertaining to the sexual harassment policy should be
kept as part of each person’s permanent personnel file).
232. EEOC NOTICE 915.002, supra note 220 (noting that “[a]n employer’s harassment
complaint procedure should be designed to encourage victims to come forward.”).
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explain the complaint process.233 A written procedure for reporting
incidents of harassment should do the following: (1) specify the steps to
take to initiate a harassment complaint; (2) refrain from requiring an
alleged victim to first bring the complaint to the offending supervisor; (3)
encourage the alleged victim to confront the offending person; (4) prohibit
retaliation against anyone reporting sexual harassment; (5) encourage
employees to report all occurrences of harassment; (6) and promote
confidentiality. It is also crucial that the employer’s antiharassment policy
and complaint procedure contain information pertaining to the timeframe
for filing charges of unlawful harassment with the EEOC or state fair
employment practice agencies.234
In addition, the sexual harassment policy should ensure that there are
no unreasonable obstacles to filing a complaint.235 To the contrary,
employers should encourage employees to report all occurrences.
Employees must be provided with multiple convenient outlets through
which to submit complaints. What might initially appear to be an isolated
incident to an employee could actually be a part of a pattern of conduct for
which an employer may be found liable. A single incident, when combined
with other seemingly harmless incidents or factors, may also rise to the
level of severity and pervasiveness necessary to make a claim actionable.
Moreover, policies requiring claimants to report alleged harassment to
an immediate supervisor are ineffective because the supervisor himself may
be the culprit.236 Although the sexual harassment policy should require
supervisors to report complaints of harassment to appropriate officials,237
233. EEOC NOTICE 915.002, supra note 220 (suggesting, “[a] complaint procedure should
not be rigid, since that could defeat the goal of preventing and correcting harassment.”).
234. Id. (suggesting that the policy must explain that the deadline runs from the last date of
unlawful harassment, not from the date the complaint is resolved). See Currier v. Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc., 159 F.3d 1363, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that an
employer’s affirmatively misleading statements pertaining to the resolution of the grievance
in the employee’s favor can establish an equitable estoppel claim and thus allow the plaintiff
to file the complaint after the statute of limitations has run); Miranda v. B & B Cash
Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1532 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that the tolling of
statutory time for filing a complaint is allowed where plaintiff was misled by the employer
to believe that discriminatory treatment would be resolved); Miller v. Beneficial
Management Corp., 977 F.2d 834, 845 (3d Cir. N.J. 1992) (stating that equitable tolling
applies where employer’s own acts or omissions lured the plaintiff into foregoing a prompt
attempt to vindicate his rights).
235. EEOC NOTICE 915.002, supra note 220.
236. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2293 (U.S. 1998) (noting that the
City of Boca Raton’s policy “did not include any assurance that the harassing supervisors
could be bypassed in registering complaints.”).
237. Wilson v. Tulsa Junior College, 164 F.3d 534, 541 (10th Cir. 1998) (complaint
procedure was deficient because it only required supervisors to report “formal” as opposed
to “informal” complaints of harassment); Varner v. National Super Markets Inc., 94 F.3d
1209, 1214 (8th Cir. Mo. 1996) (complaint procedure was not effective if it did not require
supervisor with knowledge of harassment to report the information to those in position to
take appropriate action).
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the EEOC suggests that an employer designate at least one official outside
the employee’s chain of command to hear complaints of harassment.238
Antiharassment policies and complaint procedures must also state that
employees are protected from retaliation for reporting harassment or
providing information relating to such complaints.239 Without assurance
against retaliation, an antiharassment policy or a complaint procedure can
be rendered ineffective.240 An employer creates legal and financial
exposure by failing to shield employees against negative retaliation.241
Therefore, the employer must safeguard employees against retaliation from
its supervisors.242
Finally, the employer should make explicitly clear to employees that it
will protect the confidentiality of harassment allegations to any extent
possible, and deal with any reports in a confidential, need-to-know
manner.243 The employer should also disclose that complete confidentiality
cannot always be guaranteed because the employer’s duty to investigate
presumes sharing and disclosing information with the alleged harasser,
witnesses, and others who may become involved.244
238. EEOC NOTICE 915.002, supra note 220 (“For example, if the employer has an office
of human resources, one or more officials in that office could be authorized to take
complaints. Allowing an employee to bypass his or her chain of command provides
additional assurance that the complaint will be handled in an impartial manner, since an
employee who reports harassment by his or her supervisor may feel that officials within the
chain of command will more readily believe the supervisor’s version of events.”).
239. Id.
240. Id. Surveys have shown that a common reason for failure to report harassment to
management is fear of retaliation. See, e.g., Louise F. Fitzgerald & Suzanne Swan, Why Didn’t
She Just Report Him? The Psychological and Legal Implications of Women’s Responses to
Sexual Harassment, 51 J. OF SOCIAL ISSUES 117, 122–23 (1995) (citing studies that have shown
that a significant proportion of harassment victims are worse off after complaining).
241. See, e.g., The Associated Press, State Pays Fired KDHR Employee $510,000, THE
TOPEKA CAPITAL JOURNAL, Mar. 29, 1999, available at http://cjonline.com/stories/032899
/kan_kdhrpayment.shtml.
In March 1998, the court upheld a jury award to a former employee of the
Kansas Department of Human Resources for $300,000. Legal fees and interest
brought the total to $510,000. The victim claimed that she had been
unlawfully terminated as retaliation for filing a sexual harassment complaint.
She alleged her manager had subjected her to sexual harassment for a number
of years, including such actions as repeatedly asking her for sex, groping her in
the office, and asking to take nude pictures of her. Other managers lobbied her
not to file a lawsuit but to let the matter drop, which would be more favorable
to her job position. She agreed not to sue, but after the deadline for filing suit
expired, she was fired for deficiencies in her work.
Pearce & DiLullo, supra note 230, at 17.
242. EEOC NOTICE 915.002, supra note 220 (“For example, when management
investigates a complaint of harassment, the official who interviews the parties and witnesses
should remind these individuals about the prohibition against retaliation. Management also
should scrutinize employment decisions affecting the complainant and witnesses during and
after the investigation to ensure that such decisions are not based on retaliatory motives.”).
243. Id.
244. Id.
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C. INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS
If an employee complains to management about alleged sexual
harassment, widespread favoritism, or sexual discrimination, the employer
is obligated to investigate the allegation.245 An employer can shield itself
from liability by acting reasonably in response to a claim of sexual
harassment.246 Different approaches exist to handling claims and the
employer has latitude in deciding what strategies to implement in response
to sexual harassment claims.247 As a result, courts have focused on
employers’ actions to resolve sexual harassment claims, instead of applying
a checklist of proper actions.248
EEOC guidelines provide that an employer must take “prompt
remedial action” reasonably calculated to end sexual harassment.249 Once
an employer becomes aware of sexual harassment, the guidelines
establish a duty for the employer to investigate. To defend against a
subsequent claim of a hostile work environment, an employer must prove
that they took prompt action to correct harassing behavior.250
The investigation should involve a representative committee
including men and women, preferably qualified and trained on
They should possess the
harassment law and company policy.251
interviewing and critical analysis skills needed to conduct an
investigation. They should also be capable of maintaining objectivity and
refrain from forming or expressing opinions during the investigation
process.252 The investigating committee must be sensitive to and
respectful of the interests of all parties involved, as indicated by
consideration of such factors as work schedules, language issues, and
hierarchical relationships.

245. EEOC NOTICE 915.002, supra note 220 (“When employee complains to management
about alleged harassment, the employer is obligated to investigate the allegation regardless
of whether it conforms to a particular format or is made in writing.”).
246. Swenson v. Potter, 271 F.3d 1184, 1196 (9th Cir. 2001) (“the employer will insulate
itself from Title VII liability if it acts reasonably”). See Harris v. L & L Wings, Inc., 132
F.3d 978, 984 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[A] good faith investigation of alleged harassment may
satisfy the ‘prompt and adequate’ response standard, even if the investigation turns up no
evidence of harassment . . . [and] a jury later concludes that in fact harassment occurred.”).
247. United States v. New York City Transit Auth., 97 F.3d 672, 677 (2d Cir. 1996).
248. Jayesh Shah, Limiting Expert Testimony About Sexual Harassment Policies, 1999 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 587, 611 (1999).
249. See EEOC NOTICE 915.002, supra note 220.
250. Justin P. Smith, Letting the Master Answer: Employer Liability for Sexual
Harassment in the Workplace after Faragher and Burlington Industries, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1786, 1794 (1999).
251. See Pearce & DiLullo, supra note 230.
252. Id. at 19. See K. W. Samuels & S. Leung, Harassment-Proofed is Liability-Proofed;
The EEOC and the Supreme Court Clarify Ways Employers Can Limit or Escape Liability
for Supervisory Harassment, 22 NAT. L. J. B9 (1999).
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If a company executive is the focus of the harassment claim, an
outside independent investigator should be considered. To avoid charges
of favoritism, pre-established guidelines for investigations should be
standard but flexible.
Because a false claim of harassment can greatly damage the
reputation of the accused, defamation is another real concern.253
Everyone involved should be informed of the risks of a defamation claim
and of the need to keep all information confidential, except as required in
to resolve the claim.

V. CONCLUSION
Third-party plaintiffs may have a cause of action based on a hostile
work environment when sexual harassment unreasonably interferes in the
workplace; when widespread sexual favoritism contributes to an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment; or when employees who
are not personally harassed lose job benefits to less qualified employees
who submit to such harassment.
Historically, courts have been slow to elucidate the legal standards that
third parties needed to satisfy in order to prevail on sexual harassment
claims, such as the expectation that plaintiffs provide compelling evidence
of quid pro quo demands or of a hostile work environment. However,
recent decisions are bringing clarity to sexual harassment law, and new
theories are providing promising options for potential plaintiffs. In
particular, because of the viability and increasing public and industry
awareness of sex-plus theory, both the number of sexual favoritism claims
and the frequency of positive results for claimants may increase in the
coming years.
Employers need to respond to ongoing threats of sexual harassment by
implementing prevention measures and swiftly investigating employee
complaints. Additionally, they need to recognize that some victims of
sexual harassment can be found among the untargeted co-workers of the
perpetrator. Not only do business policies and managerial action need to
protect these third parties from sexual harassment, but employers must also
educate employees about their rights and employers’ responsibilities in
helping to safeguard employees’ working environments.

253. See Pearce & DiLullo, supra note 230 at 19. See also, e.g., Stockley v. AT&T, 687 F.
Supp. 764, 768–69 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
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